SOF INTRAPRENEURSHIP: HOW SOF CAN LEVERAGE ENTREPRENEURSHIP WITHIN THE MILITARY BUREAUCRACY TO MANAGE COMPLEXITY by Berntsen, Oerjan & Kuehnle, Erich
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2021-06
SOF INTRAPRENEURSHIP: HOW SOF CAN
LEVERAGE ENTREPRENEURSHIP WITHIN THE
MILITARY BUREAUCRACY TO MANAGE COMPLEXITY
Berntsen, Oerjan; Kuehnle, Erich
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/67663
Copyright is reserved by the copyright owner.








SOF INTRAPRENEURSHIP: HOW SOF CAN  
LEVERAGE ENTREPRENEURSHIP WITHIN THE  
MILITARY BUREAUCRACY TO MANAGE COMPLEXITY 
by 
Oerjan Berntsen and Erich Kuehnle 
June 2021 
Thesis Advisor: Leo J. Blanken 
Second Readers: Nicholas Dew 
 Justin P. Davis 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.




3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master's thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
SOF INTRAPRENEURSHIP: HOW SOF CAN LEVERAGE
ENTREPRENEURSHIP WITHIN THE MILITARY BUREAUCRACY
TO MANAGE COMPLEXITY
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Oerjan Berntsen and Erich Kuehnle












11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
 In an environment steeped in complexity, military organizations must be able to respond 
to change. By drawing from the fields of complexity and entrepreneurship and from military 
innovation literature, we create a concept called special operations forces (SOF) intrapreneurship. 
SOF intrapreneurship leverages SOF characteristics to increase innovative capacity. SOF 
intrapreneurship balances the tensions of entrepreneurship with the inherent characteristics of the 
military bureaucracy. The concept provides the tools to navigate, iterate, and pivot, giving 
organizations the framework for exploring and implementing innovations. SOF intrapreneurship, 
therefore, provides a way for SOF to respond to changes in the environment and, ultimately, 
remain an effective and relevant choice for decision and policy makers in an environment of 
constant change.
14. SUBJECT TERMS
special operations forces, SOF, intrapreneurship, entrepreneurship, military bureaucracy,
complexity, complex environment, innovation, adaptation, emulation, imitation, diffusion,




















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
SOF INTRAPRENEURSHIP: HOW SOF CAN LEVERAGE 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP WITHIN THE MILITARY BUREAUCRACY  
TO MANAGE COMPLEXITY 
Oerjan Berntsen 
Major, Norwegian Army 
B, The Norwegian Military Academy, 2010 
 
Erich Kuehnle 
Lieutenant Colonel, Canadian Army 
BA, Royal Military College of Canada, 2007 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS  
(IRREGULAR WARFARE) 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
June 2021 
Approved by: Leo J. Blanken 
 Advisor 
 Nicholas Dew 
 Second Reader 
 Justin P. Davis 
 Second Reader 
 Douglas A. Borer 
 Chair, Department of Defense Analysis 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
In an environment steeped in complexity, military organizations must be able to 
respond to change. By drawing from the fields of complexity and entrepreneurship and 
from military innovation literature, we create a concept called special operations forces 
(SOF) intrapreneurship. SOF intrapreneurship leverages SOF characteristics to increase 
innovative capacity. SOF intrapreneurship balances the tensions of entrepreneurship with 
the inherent characteristics of the military bureaucracy. The concept provides the tools to 
navigate, iterate, and pivot, giving organizations the framework for exploring and 
implementing innovations. SOF intrapreneurship, therefore, provides a way for SOF to 
respond to changes in the environment and, ultimately, remain an effective and relevant 
choice for decision and policy makers in an environment of constant change.
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As the United States and Allies wind down from the nearly two-decades-long 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, they should realign to a global environment where their 
technological superiority is shrinking and resurgent and revisionist peer and near-pear 
competitors are challenging the status quo. This changing global environment has led 
senior civilian and military leadership to promote innovation and change to western 
militaries to meet the new reality. This newfound sense of urgency, however, is nothing 
new. For the last century, large strategic changes have impacted the relevancy and 
effectiveness of military organization every couple of decades. This is the inherent nature 
of the complexity of our environment.  
To remain relevant and effective in complex environments, special operations 
forces (SOF) should adopt SOF intrapreneurship, which leverages SOF characteristics to 
increase innovative capacity. By harnessing relevant practices and benefits from 
Entrepreneurship and combining it with the construct of the military organization, SOF 
intrapreneurship provides the tools to navigate, iterate, and pivot (see figure below).  
 







   
 
xiv 
SOF intrapreneurship takes a hybrid approach leveraging the best from two worlds. 
By balancing these approaches, SOF intrapreneurship is a framework for increasing 
innovative capacity. Complexity, encompassing the effects of friction, wicked problems, 
and complex adaptive systems, makes the framework for SOF intrapreneurship less linear 
than depicted and creates continuous feedback loops. The purpose of step 1, navigate, is to 
build context of the changing complex environment for innovation. Step 2, iterate, intends 
to find and develop the “right” innovations. Lastly, step 3, pivot, is about implementing the 
innovation. The triangle illustrates an inverted funnel, through which selected outputs are 
pushed upwards. Unlike a funnel that sees product flow downwards simply by gravity, 
SOF intrapreneurship requires deliberate effort to filter up through high volume demands 
and select outputs for furtherance.  
 




Change is inevitable. Following a perceived strategic shift to Great Power 
Competition, Western senior military and civilian leadership have increasingly recognized 
and promoted a need for change and innovation in military organizations.1 The resurgence 
of peer and near-peer actors in the international arena, for instance, has spurred the United 
States “to pursue innovative ways to sustain and advance [their] military superiority for the 
21st Century.”2 This sense of urgency, however, is nothing new. Since the end of World 
War II (WWII) many environmental shifts have occurred; they even seem to occur every 
other decade or so. First, the advent of the nuclear era and the start of the Cold War required 
Western militaries to change. The Vietnam War illustrated that wars are not always 
winnable with the formula “mobility plus firepower.”3 Later, the end of the Cold War 
marked the beginning of American hegemony and Western technological superiority for 
years to come. Yet only a decade later on 9/11, the West learned that technological 
superiority would not suffice against an increasingly networked, agile, and determined 
adversary. All the while, peer and near-peer actors have been slowly reducing Western, 
and U.S. in particular, military hegemony.4  
Change without context is meaningless; when the environment changes, so should 
actors in it. While innovation is commonly viewed as the panacea to the military 
organization, the complex environment challenges actors in determining what innovations 
will help or hinder. Innovation is “the exploitation of new ideas.”5 Aside from the 
 
1 Forsvaret Spesialstyrker Stab [NORSOCOM], “Utvikling av Spesialstyrkene mot 2030 
[Development of the Special Operations Forces towards 2030]” (Forsvaret [Norwegian Armed Forces], 
2019); Eric Schmidt, “Statement to House Armed Services Committee,” April 17, 2018; CANSOFCOM 
Future Operating Concept Handbook (Canadian Armed Forces, 2019). 
2 Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “The Defense Innovation Initiative,” November 15, 2014, 1, 
www.defense.gov/pubs/ OSD013411-14.pdf. 
3 John Arquilla and Nancy C Roberts, “Design of Warfare” (Manuscript Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2017), 58. 
4 For a contemporary study of this, see: David Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest 
Learned to Fight the West (Oxford University Press, 2020). 
5 A Baregheh, J Rowley, and S Sambrook, “Towards a Multidisciplinary Definition of Innovation,” 
Management Decision 47, no. 8 (2009): 1323–39. 
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definitive outcomes of tactical operations, there is no mechanism to ensure that militaries 
are deriving, preparing, and adopting the right ideas at the right time. As LTG H.R. 
McMaster writes in the foreword to Forging the Sword, “war is the final auditor of military 
organizations.”6 Military organizations, moreover, are inherently rigid and bureaucratic, 
an attempt to formalize at scale and reduce friction or uncertainty in the face of combat.7 
Bureaucracies are often custom built to operate in relative certainty and manage the status 
quo at scale. This works exceptionally well in specific contexts but also makes change 
inherently difficult and slow. 
Conventional military organizations often struggle to exist in this tension between 
rigid bureaucracy and a changing environment. Special operations forces (SOF) are more 
a part of the military bureaucracy and challenged by its implications than they may believe. 
While SOF enjoy inherent strengths in potential for change due to smaller size, some 
degree of flexibility, and increased freedom, they still rely heavily on the larger military 
bureaucracy in strategy, doctrine, organization, and technology. Even United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) “fought a losing battle to keep [the] command from 
becoming bigger and more bureaucratic.”8 Further, some argue that SOF’s increasing 
levels of bureaucratization and conventionalization at higher levels of the command 
structure have “taken the ‘special’ out of … special operations.”9  
SOF should continually change to retain the title of “special.” SOF can be defined 
as “small, specially organized units manned by carefully selected people using modified 
equipment and trained in unconventional applications of tactics.”10 While the very term 
 
6 Benjamin M. Jensen, Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2016), vii. 
7 Hans Hasselbladh and Karl Ydén, “Why Military Organizations Are Cautious About Learning?,” 
Armed Forces & Society 46, no. 3 (July 2020): 475–94, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X19832058. 
8 Mark Bowden, “American Special Ops Forces Are Everywhere,” The Atlantic, March 12, 2021, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2021/04/how-special-ops-became-the-solution-to-
everything/618080/. 
9 Sadcom via Happycom, “What Can Be Done About SOCOM?: Part Four of Four of ‘What’s Wrong 
with SOCOM?,’” Small Wars Journal, January 4, 2017. 
10 Robert G. Spulak, Jr, “A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and Use of SOF,” 
JSOU Report (Hurlburt Field, Florida: Joint Special Operations University, 2007), 1. 
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“special” implies something unique and of value-added, this “specialness” is not static. If 
our organizations are not changing with the environment as a continuous practice, finding 
competitive advantage, and exploiting existing and emerging opportunities, can they claim 
to be “special?” Does SOF run the risk of becoming just like conventional forces? Eliot 
Cohen describes the “laboratory role” that elite units are positioned to support in 
developing new approaches for the broader force.11 This approach requires a renewed 
consideration of what it is that defines SOF as “special” in relation to the broader force and 
the environment. A key issue is understanding that innovation may be militarily valuable 
but also needs to be done deliberately in a military setting. A lack of a coherent and 
deliberate practice of innovation leads to lost opportunities and inappropriate changes. This 
leads us to propose that adopting entrepreneurship practices in conjunction with SOF 
bureaucratic conditions can lead to increased success.  
Specifically, we suggest SOF adopt the concept of SOF intrapreneurship, which 
leverages SOF characteristics to increase innovative capacity. SOF intrapreneurship 
provides the tools for organizations to navigate, iterate, and pivot in a complex 
environment. Such a concept is particularly suited to SOF, as it draws on the advantages 
from entrepreneurial activity, while leveraging the strengths and managing the challenges 
of the military organization. Whereas bureaucracy is characterized by the degree of control, 
rigidity, and size in corporate and military organizations, entrepreneurship is characterized 
by freedom, change, and risk tolerance as a sort of contrasting approach to managing 
complexity. SOF intrapreneurship is a hybrid approach leveraging the best from two 
worlds.  
In developing this concept, we will first explore the term innovation within the 
complex environment. We will then explore the characteristics of military bureaucracies 
to assess the challenges and advantages in attempting meaningful change through 
innovation. Turning towards the field of entrepreneurship, we synthesize lessons from the 
literature on how individuals and organizations gain competitive advantages while 
 
11 Eliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies, Harvard 
Studies in International Affairs 40 (Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978), 31–32. 
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acknowledging the gaps in applying to military bureaucracy. Last, we conclude that an 
intrapreneurial approach fits well and, combined with other ideas about military innovation 
literature, we create a framework for SOF intrapreneurship. While the framework explored 
here is specific to SOF intrapreneurship, it could also prove applicable to military 
organizations, writ large in varying degrees.  
   
 
5 
II. ON INNOVATION 
The ability of organizations to effectively respond to changes in the environment is 
what keeps them relevant and effective over time. Innovation is the process in which these 
changes occur. While the literature on military innovation has grown steadily in recent 
decades, it has yet to produce an agreed-upon definition.12 We understand innovation, 
therefore, as “the successful exploitation of new ideas.”13 Our understanding of innovation 
includes changes in wartime and peacetime, small change and big change, and several 
categories of change.  
Some view innovations in wartime and peacetime as very different processes.14 To 
be sure, there are differences. Innovations in peacetime are conducted against an 
indeterminate enemy, at an unknown time and place. Innovations in wartime, on the other 
hand, are developed with a specific enemy, time, and place in mind.15 The strategic 
contexts in peace, moreover, are different from the political, financial, and cultural 
environment of wartime.16 Nevertheless, those that succeed in one environment often do 
so in the other.17 Furthermore, innovations are seldom completed in either peacetime or 
 
12 For a summary of the field of studies on military innovation, we recommend the following 
literature: Adam Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 
5 (October 2006): 905–34; Stuart Griffin, “Military Innovation Studies: Multidisciplinary or Lacking 
Discipline?,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 1–2 (January 2017): 196–224, https://doi.org/10.1080/
01402390.2016.1196358; Michael C. Horowitz and Shira Pindyck, “What Is a Military Innovation? A 
Proposed Framework,” Social Science Research Network, December 15, 2019, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.3504246. 
13 Baregheh, Rowley, and Sambrook, “Towards a Multidisciplinary Definition of Innovation.” 
14 See for instance the distinction between what Murray and Millett call innovation and adaptation: 
Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996); Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
15 Murray, Military Adaptation in War, 309. 
16 Williamson Murray, “Innovation: Past and Future,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, 
ed. Williamson. Murray and Allan Reed. Millett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 301. 
17 Murray, Military Adaptation in War, 5. 
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wartime; they usually start in one and continue into the other.18 Hence, we include changes 
in both wartime and peacetime in our definition of innovation.  
It is also common to differentiate innovations on a scale of significance. The terms 
sustaining and disrupting innovations were popularized by Clayton Christenson for 
describing changes in the commercial sector.19 He found that some innovations sustained 
the current method or product, while other innovations disrupted it, making the former 
method or product obsolete. While both sustaining and disruptive innovations give the 
innovator an advantage, disruptive innovation gives a bigger and longer advantage.20 
Within the field of study of military innovation, it is largely disruptive change that has been 
researched, simply because “minor military change is less important.”21 However, since 
disruptive changes are rare, it would be less useful for SOF to focus exclusively on 
disruptive innovations. Sustaining innovations, moreover, can over time aggregate to 
produce disruptive effects. We therefore include the full scale of innovations in our 
understanding. 
Innovations come also in different categories. In Figure 1, three common 
descriptions are visualized. At the top of the figure, hardware and software are the most 
simplistic way of describing innovations, with hardware representing technology, and 
software everything else. The middle divides innovations into three, breaking software into 
organization and doctrine. The bottom is the most detailed categorization, breaking 
organization and doctrine down further. Whatever the categorization of innovations, they 
 
18 Theo Farrell, Sten Rynning, and Terry Terriff, Transforming Military Power since the Cold War: 
Britain, France, and the United States, 1991–2012 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 290. 
19 Several other terms are also used, such as: evolutionary and revolutionary, minor and major, 
incremental and discontinuous. For the purpose of this research the authors will continue to use sustaining 
and disruptive. Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great 
Firms to Fail, The Management of Innovation and Change Series (Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School 
Press, 1997).  
20 John J. Gartska, “Patterns in Innovation,” in Transforming Defense Capabilities (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2009), 57–78. 
21 Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, eds., The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology 
(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 6. 
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are usually most effective when developed in combination with each other.22 All these 
categorizations are useful when describing types of military innovation, and we include 
them all in our understanding of innovation.  
 
Figure 1. Categories of innovation.23 
While there are not an agreed upon definition on military innovation, Horowitz and 
Pindyck explain that is because earlier research on military innovation focuses on distinct 
stages of the innovation process.24 Innovation follows three stages:  
The first stage of this process is invention, when new technologies or tactics 
are created, or existing technologies or tactics are applied to specific 
operational problems in new ways. This is followed by the incubation stage, 
when the invention gains status and influence through both top-down and 
bottom-up processes. The third stage is implementation where political will 
 
22 Terry Pierce, Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies: Disguising Innovation (Taylor and Francis, 
2004), xii. 
23 Adapted from Gartska, “Patterns in Innovation”; Arquilla and Roberts, “Design of Warfare”; Emily 
O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason, eds., The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2003). 
24 Horowitz and Pindyck, “What Is a Military Innovation?,” 3. 
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leads the community of interest to adopt the innovation. It is at this point 
that a state becomes capable of fully operationalizing the innovation.25 
Interestingly, actors may have different proficiency levels in varying stages of innovation. 
For instance, Adamsky finds that the Soviet Union, through their “holistic-dialectical 
approach to military affairs” were able to develop a new concept for employing emerging 
technologies, something which a decade later would be implemented and called “Air Land 
Battle” by the United States.26 The Soviets would not have managed to invent it, however, 
if it were not for the United States’ unparalleled ability to incubate and develop technology 
such as precision guided munitions and command and control systems.27 However, neither 
the Soviets nor the United States were as effective in implementing these innovations as 
the Israelis.28 Which leads us to a last note on innovations; innovations need not be new 
or developed by the one implementing them. Emulation of successful innovations or 
imitating other actor’s innovations can be a highly effective way of increasing military 
effectiveness.29 It can be time-efficient and cost-effective. Our understanding of 
innovation is purposefully broad; including all categories of change, in peace and war, and 
both big and small.  
Innovation “does not have to be technical, does not indeed have to be a thing 
altogether.”30 It is through the practice of systemic innovation that enterprises find 
enduring advantage by searching both internally and externally for sources of change and 
potential innovation.31 Sources of innovation can be extrapolated from business literature 
to military applications and generalized as originating from six distinct categories: the 
unexpected occurrence (success, failure, event), the incongruity between reality and 
 
25 Horowitz and Pindyck, 3–4. 
26 Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the 
Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the U.S., and Israel. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2010), 54. 
27 Adamsky, 88–89. 
28 Adamsky, 125–29. 
29 Goldman and Eliason, eds., The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas, 372. 
30 Peter F. Drucker, Innovation and Entrepreneurship (New York: Harper, 1993), 31. 
31 Drucker, 34. 
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possibility in the environment, the process need, the change in industry or strategic 
structure, changes in force demographics, changes in organizational perception or vision, 
and new knowledge about the environment.32 Arguably, these sources could emanate from 
within SOF, from the strategic climate, or outside the military altogether. Any approach at 
deliberate and systemic innovation should search for opportunities from all of them. 
To borrow from the famous economist Schumpeter, warfare is like capitalism, it 
“not only never is but never can be stationary.”33 Innovation, thus, can be viewed as a 
process of “creative destruction;” “incessantly destroying” old ways and “incessantly 
creating” new ones.34 This process of creative destruction is something which the field of 
complexity has termed emergence, and which will be explored in the next section on 
complexity.  
 
32 Drucker, 35. 
33 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 
81–87. 
34 Schumpeter, 83. 
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III. AN ENVIRONMENT OF COMPLEXITY 
The military operating environment is steeped in complexity. We understand 
complexity as the effects of friction, wicked problems, and complex adaptive systems on 
our environment. Human limitations, informational uncertainties, non-linearity, social 
diversity, and interconnectedness are indicators of complexity that all create uncertainty. 
The acknowledgment of this, however, is hardly newfound. Clausewitz introduced friction, 
an expression of the complex, adaptive, and non-linear interplay between opponents in war, 
as early as the 19th century. Later research into the science of complexity has elaborated on 
Clausewitz’s notion of “the effect of reality on ideas and intentions in war,” and it is 
increasingly relevant.35 The reason is that innovations often seek to solve wicked 
problems, emerging within complex adaptive systems that interact with other complex 
adaptive systems, and are impacted by friction throughout the process of development. 
Complexity, thus, impacts our ability to assess which innovations will prove relevant and 
effective in our environment. 
Friction, as introduced by Clausewitz, impacts military innovation. Clausewitz 
recognizes “that every war is inherently a nonlinear phenomenon” and “our ability to 
predict the course and outcome of any given conflict is severely limited.”36 This operating 
environment creates what Clausewitz calls friction. Friction can be understood as 
“constraints imposed by human physical and cognitive limits,” “informational 
uncertainties and unforeseeable differences between perceived and actual reality,” and “the 
structural nonlinearity of combat processes.”37 Simply put, friction makes development of 
innovations difficult, because humans have limitations, we do not know everything, and 
the future is unpredictable.  
 
35 Hans Rothfels, quoted in: Barry D. Watts, “McNair Paper 68: Clausewitzian Friction and Future 
War Revised Edition” (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2004), 1. 
36 Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,” International 
Security 17, no. 3 (1992): 61, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539130. 
37 Watts, “Clausewitzian Friction and Future War,” 76. 
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Innovations are often solutions to wicked problems. Wicked problems arose as a 
concept in the 1960s and 1970s as a counterweight to the quantitative and algorithm-based 
scientific approach and are “problems for which there are no solutions in the sense of 
definitive and objective answers.”38 Interestingly, while non-linearity and informational 
uncertainties are important factors in wicked problems theory, wicked problems shed light 
on a different element of the complex environment: social diversity.39 Social diversity adds 
to our understanding of complexity because “what satisfies one may be abhorrent to 
another, that what comprises problem-solution for one is problem-generation for 
another.”40 Indeed, social diversity may lead to vastly different understanding, framing, 
and solutions to problems in our environment. Social diversity is very much apparent in 
military affairs and impacts organizations’ development of innovations.  
Innovations emerge within complex adaptive systems. A complex adaptive system 
is “a dynamic network of many agents acting in parallel, constantly acting and reacting to 
what the other agents are doing.”41 Complex adaptive systems consist of independent but 
interconnected elements, with non-linear and unpredictable behavior lacking centralized 
control, where even small changes can cause long-term effects.42 Even though showing 
signs of regularity, it can be interrupted by periods of non-regularity.43 A military 
formation, for instance, “behaves as [a] Complex Adaptive System formed by a large 
number of agents endowed with learning capabilities that interact between them through 
complex rules and institutions and whose aggregate response is characterised by non-
linearity, yet considerable flexibility.”44 These responses and changes within complex 
 
38 Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy 
Sciences 4, no. 2 (June 1973): 155. 
39 Rittel and Webber, 167. 
40 Rittel and Webber, 169. 
41 Antoine Bousquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of 
Modernity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 175. 
42 Paul Cairney, “Complexity Theory in Political Science and Public Policy,” Political Studies Review 
10, no. 3 (August 7, 2012): 346–58, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-9302.2012.00270.x. 
43 Cairney. 
44 Carlos Marti, Armies as Complex Adaptive Systems, 2018, 16. 
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adaptive systems are often called emergence, “the arising of novel and coherent structures, 
patterns, and properties during the process of self-organization.”45 Emergence occurs as a 
result of the interconnectedness between agents, both within a system and between 
systems, and can be understood as a constant chain of actions and reactions. These agents 
may represent individuals, organizations, and even nations and are constantly adapting to 
their environments. It is not just agents, however, that change. Agents produce change in 
other systems, such as in the technological systems. This interconnectedness and 
adaptability results in a dynamic and ever-changing environment. The number of agents 
and the interconnectedness make the variables for predicting the development of a complex 
adaptive system infinite. Complex adaptive systems encapsulate to a large extent the 
elements of friction and wicked problems and explains why they occur. Human limitations 
make it impossible to account for all variables to predict outcomes, there will always be 
informational uncertainties, the system will always be unpredictable, and, thus, there will 
also be numerous interpretations of the best response to a certain problem.  
To illustrate the effects of friction, wicked problems and complex adaptive systems 
on innovation, consider the innovation of armored warfare that saw its inception during 
World War I (WWI) and was further developed in the interwar period. Armored warfare 
was a response to the wicked problem of protracted trench warfare.46 While armored 
warfare, in hindsight, solved the wicked problem of trench warfare it was far from apparent 
at the time. During the first three years of WWI there were little development and while 
the British developed and utilized the tank at the later stages of WWI, the tank would not 
have a decisive effect until WWII. This development occurred differently in the varying 
complex military organizations of the British, French, and Germans. For most of WWI 
there existed no solution to trench warfare “in the sense of definitive and objective 
answers.”47 In the interwar period, however, the process of developing armored warfare 
 
45 Jeffrey Goldstein, “Emergence as a Construct: History and Issues,” Emergence 1 (March 1, 1999): 
49, https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327000em0101_4. 
46 Williamson Murray, “Armored Warfare,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, ed. 
Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7. 
47 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” 155. 
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intensified, yet it was filled with friction, and it was not until the invasion of Poland in 
1939 “that the [German] officer corps as a whole began to grasp the potential of armored 
exploitation.”48 Far worse was the situation in France, which, despite “[taking] their 
preparations for a ground war seriously,” had spent large amounts of resources on the 
formidable Maginot-line.49 The French defensive concept, an incremental approach to 
innovate trench warfare, was believed to stop any German aggression, yet shows “the effect 
of reality on ideas and intentions in war.”50  
One of the more prominent military theorists of the modern era, John Boyd, 
recognized this complexity and provided a useful model for making sense of it. One of the 
key elements of his famous Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) model is the creation 
(and destruction) of mental models, representations of the world.51 Due to the complexity 
of the real world and cognitive limitations, mental models will never be perfect. Moreover, 
due to the world constantly changing, mental models should be updated continuously. 
Eventually, one or more of the mental models will be faulty, leading to the destruction of 
one or more mental models and the creation of newer, more accurate, models.52 A useful 
way of thinking of Boyd’s mental model is in terms of map and terrain. The map (mental 
model) helps navigate the terrain (the complex real-world). If the terrain is not 
corresponding with your map, it is seldom the terrain that is wrong. Hence, the mental 
model should be adjusted to represent the real world. Furthermore, the map will never 
replicate the complexity and details of the terrain. As such, parts of the mental model will 
always be faulty or lacking information. Also, the map represents only one piece of terrain; 
when moving out of the area covered by the map, a new map is needed. Hence, different 
environments require different mental models. Last, terrain changes with time and maps 
should as well. Our environment is constantly changing—technologically, socially, 
 
48 Murray, “Armored Warfare,” 43. 
49 Murray, 31. 
50 Hans Rothfels, quoted in: Watts, “Clausewitzian Friction and Future War,” 1. 
51 John A Boyd, “A Discourse on Winning and Losing,” ed. Grant T. Hammond (Air University 
Press, 2018), 384–85, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Books/
B_0151_Boyd_Discourse_Winning_Losing.PDF. 
52 John R. Boyd, “Destruction and Creation,” September 3, 1976. 
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politically and so on—and our mental model must change with it. Due to all these factors, 
our mental models are constantly refined, adjusted, and, eventually, destroyed and 
recreated to explain and make sense of our observations of the real world. 
Dealing with this complexity can be measured in an organization’s ability to 
effectively process, store, and act on information from the environment.53 This is what 
Bousquet calls organizational complexity, the ability to “balance at the edge of chaos” 
between order and disorder, where emergent behavior is at its greatest (see Figure 2).54 
Order and disorder represent theoretical extremes, and any organization existing within 
complex adaptive systems balances its response to its environment between these 
spectrums. This response is often called feedback. Feedback can either have “a stabilizing 
adjustment to guide or return the [organization] to the desired state,” or amplify 
disturbances to the organization “and thus moves the [organization] further away from its 
point of origin.”55 In other words, feedback either provides order and rigidity, or amplify 
disorder and change.56 In a military setting, order implies centralization, rigidity, control 
measures, stability, and little to no capacity for change. Disorder, on the other hand, is the 
opposite, decentralization, freedom, autonomy, and capacity to change. Balancing the 
tension between order and disorder is the key to achieving emergent behavior within 
complex adaptive systems. Disorderly emergence results in chaos, while no emergence 
results in stagnation. This is relevant because innovation within military organizations is 
emergent behavior. Military organizations are, therefore, required to balance these forces 
of order and disorder to achieve the exact tension for enough innovation to change to the 
environment, while not creating chaos and disorder within the organization.  
 
53 Bousquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare, 178. 
54 Bousquet, 178. 
55 Bousquet, 165. 
56 Bousquet, 165, 167. 




Figure 2. Organizational complexity is highest at the tension between order 
and disorder.57 
While it is natural to relate complexity to times of war, it also provides a good 
description of what peacetime organizations must deal with. As an illustration, consider 
the difficulties of predicting and anticipating the future character of warfare. Peacetime 
environments do not present a known adversary, the area of conflict, nor the time for when 
conflict will take place.58 Peacetime organizations often, therefore, receive little, if any, 
feedback on the effectiveness of the military organization. Exacerbated, furthermore, by 
the fact that it is impossible to replicate the environment of war, times of peace may, 
paradoxically, have more uncertainty than those of war.59 It is possible to prepare for war 
in times of peace by leveraging the ongoing conflicts and lessons occurring elsewhere as 
test-beds for innovation and strategy evolution. To distinguish between wartime and 
peacetime, however, proposes a challenge, since the terms are ever more blurred. Since the 
end of WWII, an increasing number of categories explaining conflicts below the threshold 
of war has been introduced.60 Like most of these in-between categories of conflicts is that 
 
57 Adapted from Bousquet, 179. 
58 Murray, Military Adaptation in War, 309. 
59 Murray, 309. 
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they represent a state of conflict where the tactical and operational levels are in contact 
with the enemy, while the strategic and political levels are comfortably distanced from it. 
This represents a state where the tactical and operational environments are that of war, 
while the strategic and political environments are that of peace. Regardless of how we 
categorize the environment, we can assert that it is complex, and military organizations 
must deal with it, whether they are at peace or in war.  
The military operating environment, in peace and war, is steeped in complexity. 
SOF’s ability to deal with the environment is impacted by human limitations, informational 
uncertainties, non-linearity, social diversity, and interconnectedness between complex 
adaptive systems. As illustrated in Figure 2, there are fundamentally two ways of 
responding to this complexity. An organization can accept disorder and constantly react 
and respond to inputs from the environment. On the other hand, an organization can create 
certainty by imposing order, becoming less responsive to the external environment in the 
process. We shall now turn to one way of organizing that emphasizes order, the military 
bureaucracy.  
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IV. THE MILITARY BUREAUCRACY AND SOF 
While there are different types of bureaucracies, the military bureaucracy is 
designed to “exercise large-scale violence as the ultimate tool of sovereign nation-
states.”61 This leaves the military organization distinct, in some respects, from other 
bureaucracies, yet it still portrays traditional bureaucratic characteristics such as 
formalization, hierarchy, and institutionalization.62 Most studies on military organizations 
note, rightly, that they are ill-suited to change—and, hence, also ill-suited to respond to 
changes in the complex environment. Like most public service-oriented institutions, simply 
“existing” consumes significant resources and capacity and presents an obstacle to 
change.63 The underlying distinction is that public-service institutions, including the 
military, exist to do “good” for multiple societal stakeholders as an absolute rather than 
producing profits for stockholders.64  
Militaries have particularly developed towards becoming organizations that strive 
“to impose order on the inherent chaos of battle.”65 One reason for this is that militaries 
reduce friction by increasing size and imposing control and rigidity. Size and superiority 
of numbers are especially important, since they, according to Clausewitz, are “the most 
common element in victory.”66 The reason is, bluntly put, that “when threatened by 
destruction, or the task of destroying an enemy, more is better.”67 However, the expense 
of increased size is increased control and rigidity—imposed to reduce friction in 
“ambiguous, dangerous, swiftly changing and highly consequential conditions.”68 
 
61 Hasselbladh and Ydén, “Why Military Organizations Are Cautious About Learning?,” 5. 
62 Hasselbladh and Ydén, 5. 
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64 Drucker, 178–180. 
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66 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), 194. 
67 Spulak, Jr, “A Theory of Special Operations,” 10. 
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Increased control and rigidity are a “functional mechanism to ensure organizational 
stability and robust performance.”69 Control and rigidity are, therefore, essential for large 
military organizations in maintaining military effectiveness because they produce order in 
otherwise uncertain environments.70  
Increased size, control, and rigidity, however, are antithetical to responding to 
changes in the complex environment, because of how they inhibit the organization’s ability 
to change.71 Some have even termed militaries the quintessential bureaucracy.72 The 
bureaucracy “exists to increase the predictability of government action by applying general 
rules to specific cases.”73 It is characterized by specialization and division of labor, within 
hierarchical structures governed by rules and regulations.74 All of which are meant to 
create efficiency and accountability, yet effectively reduce organizational complexity by 
over-imposing order.  
Military organizations are plagued with long correspondence “to” lines and 
conference rooms filled with people, leading to the antithesis of nimble thought.75 Big 
structure creates deep habits over time that are hard to break and even harder to adapt 
continually. While long-range strategies and business plans brief well at the operational 
and tactical level, the real world will not wait for doctrinal adjustment and bureaucratic 
reorganization.76 SOF tended to start as small, agile, well-resourced organizations at the 
fringe of the larger military complex and supported by key stakeholders. Over time, their 
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success (and failure in some instances) has led to increased attention, resourcing, size, 
tasks, and processes. All of these contribute to organizational inertia that, absent a new 
perspective, can make change slow and potentially counter-productive. This inertia creates 
a perspective that “stopping what has always been done and doing something new are 
equally anathema to service institutions. The inertia inherent in bureaucracies makes both 
instituting change and stopping it equally painful.”77 
James Q. Wilson describes the challenge of gradual bureaucratization of 
organizations and the implications for the executives that lead them. “The longer an agency 
exists,” he explains, “the more likely that its core tasks will be defined in ways that 
maximize the costs of changing them. Innovation in these cases requires an exercise of 
judgment, personal skill, and misdirection, qualities that are rare among government 
executives.”78 Such corporations have several options available to them. They can 
continue down the path of bureaucratization to eventually find themselves out of touch 
with the market, can establish or acquire fringe entities to continue to evolve or seek 
relevance and then integrate them when innovations stick, or they can fundamentally 
change their approach towards change. Ultimately, while bureaucracy serves as a 
mechanism to reduce friction and uncertainty, it can leave SOF with reduced flexibility 
and capacity for change in complexity.  
 
77 Drucker, Innovation and Entrepreneurship, 177. 
78 Wilson, Bureaucracy, 232.  
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V. ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SOF 
Entrepreneurship can be defined, in simple terms, as the practice of systemic 
innovation.79 Whereas bureaucracy is characterized by the degree of control, rigidity, and 
size in corporate and military organizations, entrepreneurship is characterized by freedom, 
change, and risk tolerance as a sort of contrasting approach to managing complexity. In 
simple terms, “innovation” is the “what” and “entrepreneurship” is the “how.” This 
important relationship between the innovations sought by SOF and the applied practice of 
entrepreneurship often goes unnoticed in favor of the next new gadget.  
Any individual or organization that constantly searches for change in uncertainty, 
responds to it, and exploits it as an opportunity, is an entrepreneur.80 Entrepreneurs could 
exist within any type of organizational structure from a government agency to a non-profit 
to a for-profit or venture capital-backed startup.81 The concept of an entrepreneur is similar 
to the common understanding of the term “start-up,” albeit with different initial conditions 
governing development and different emerging goal systems. Eric Ries, states that the 
concept of a startup (or in other words, an entrepreneurial team) is organization size, 
industry, and economic sector agnostic. Thus, in a military context, entrepreneurship could 
be considered applicable to some degree for any organization. The key mission and output 
of entrepreneurship is innovation. Too often, organizations fail to differentiate between 
acquisition or invention and the more critical notion that innovation involves everything 
from process updates to the integration of new technology into capabilities. Many strategic 
military guidance documents are rife with the use and misuse of the term “innovation” and 
could potentially lead subordinate organizations and teams to be unclear on what this 
means or how to implement it. The innovation literature generally emphasizes that simply 
having an innovation strategy is not enough; the strategy should be distributed as a mindset 
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and practice throughout the depth of the organization and should have the necessary 
organizational elements to align and support change.82 
There are many examples of successful innovations that have risen coincidentally 
from an individual or team working diligently at the margins out of a passion for creation 
but without organizational endorsement. These rare occurrences of “successful” innovation 
though, are neither deliberate in strategy nor consistent over time. Entrepreneurship as an 
applied practice, however, is a way of ensuring that innovation happens more frequently, 
with more impact, and lower costs (e.g., when failures happen, they cost less). Effectively, 
innovation is the specific function of entrepreneurship.83 Although some innovations 
develop from the random lightbulb moment, many more develop over time through hard 
work, continual sensing of the environment, and repeated trial and error. Sarasvathy 
describes entrepreneurs as distinct from strategists or managers. Rather, they can imagine 
a potential future shaped by the inputs of organizations and constraints of the environment 
and can adjust their expectations and work with those around them to create and implement 
their innovations within this context.84  
In the mid-1980s, Drucker argued, that the previous several decades had seen a shift 
in the United States from a managerial economy to an entrepreneurial economy dominated 
by the emergence of opportunity, growth, and choice and that this would lead to a shift 
towards an entrepreneurial society over time.85 Drucker describes how innovation fits 
within entrepreneurship, and this is a useful start point for understanding its potential 
application to SOF. 
Innovation is the specific tool of entrepreneurs, the means by which they 
exploit change as an opportunity for a different business or a different 
service. It is capable of being presented as a discipline, capable of being 
learned, capable of being practiced. Entrepreneurs need to search 
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purposefully for the sources of innovation, the changes and their symptoms 
that indicate opportunities for successful innovation.86 
Innovation is thus a flexible concept that is capable of development through a deliberate 
shift towards entrepreneurship. It need not be of one character or another and SOF would 
do well to frame innovation in these terms to enable broad appreciation for its role in 
organizational change. 
In most discussions about military innovation, the underlying theme is technology 
or research and development. “Technology sets the parameters for the possibility of 
change” and creates the potential for change in military affairs and, in some cases, 
revolution.87 What enables actual change over time is the extent to which an organization 
recognizes and exploits the opportunities technology provide and changes structure and 
doctrine accordingly.88 True entrepreneurship is a behavior rooted in societal and 
economic perspectives as opposed to a high-risk personality trait possessed by a select few, 
as is often perceived.89 In entrepreneurship, change is viewed as normal and essential in 
responding to the complex system inputs and efforts are focused on developing something 
different rather than working at doing something incrementally better.90 It is clear then, 
that the deliberate practice of entrepreneurship leading to purposeful innovation is 
advantageous and relevant to SOF. Further, the historically perceived high-risk nature of 
the entrepreneurial organization and its endeavors is not a pure gamble, but rather a 
managed-risk calculation looking towards the future and where SOF can excel. 
Bureaucratic realities make entrepreneurship an imperfect solution for SOF. That 
said, the potential positive outcomes from the adoption of entrepreneurship are striking. 
Like entrepreneurs or startups, SOF must find or create a competitive advantage in existing 
and emerging arenas to remain relevant. While entrepreneurship provides a novel 
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approach, it also inherently involves working outside the system and beyond the 
established norms - both challenges in the public service institution. The earlier discussion 
of bureaucracy suggested that rigidity also serves to manage chaos and in SOF context does 
provide advantages in some respects. The rigidity imposed under bureaucracy serves in 
opposition to the potential chaos from perfect entrepreneurship. It is possible that in 
exploring this opposition, the balance to be struck between these two forces could provide 
an amplifying effect for innovative capacity within SOF when understood. 
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VI. A BETTER PATHWAY: INTRAPRENEURSHIP 
SOF requires freedom through an entrepreneurial approach that deliberately 
pursues innovation in response to the environment but also must thrive within rigidity 
inherent in the bureaucratic framework that supports them. These two concepts, freedom 
and rigidity, are in tension but both forces ultimately serve to manage complexity albeit in 
different ways. The principle of freedom refers to the SOF intrapreneur’s freedom to 
imagine, act, and fail. The freedom to imagine can be summarized as the ability to 
challenge the status quo without mental and cultural barriers. If SOF intrapreneurs are to 
find solutions to problems or exploit opportunities, they need the freedom to challenge the 
status quo. On the contrary, strong central doctrine and cultural stigma to change inhibits 
intrapreneurs from doing exactly that—two characteristics often used by militaries.91  
Bureaucracy seeks to simplify and stabilize organizations to maintain resilience 
while entrepreneurship seeks to enable constant adjustment to the complex demands of the 
environment and customers. In a SOF context, finding relative balance and mutual support 
between these forces is what will determine an organization’s innovative capacity. 
Bureaucratic rigidity makes changing course difficult and reinforces existing choices while 
entrepreneurial freedom allows flexibility between multiple potential choices but degrades 
ability to implement at scale quickly. Determining where SOF should sit on this spectrum 
is critical. The balance described is illustrated in Figure 3. Depicted on the Y axis is 
innovative capacity or actual potential for development and realization of innovation in 
response to the environment. Innovative capacity will provide a reference point for relating 
innovation to intrapreneurship in general and SOF response to the environment. It is 
inspired by the balance between order and disorder, in Figure 2, and illustrates how SOF 
should balance the advantages of the military bureaucracy and entrepreneurship.  
 
91 Raphael D. Marcus, “Military Innovation and Tactical Adaptation in the Israel–Hizballah Conflict: 
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Figure 3. Intrapreneurship leverages entrepreneurial practices within the 
military bureaucracy to increase innovative capacity in SOF. 
While deliberately combining bureaucracy and entrepreneurship affords a 
distinctive advantage to SOF, it is not a simple proposition, and there are three main 
distinctions between the approaches. First, the government bureaucratic machine requires 
certain policy and administrative conditions that cannot simply be shed in favor of free 
enterprise. SOF must remain relevant and accountable within the broader military system 
to maintain credibility and resourcing. As such, it should be considered that there are 
system rules and impositions that will continue to exist regardless of any entrepreneurial 
approaches adopted. This has implications on business processes, timelines for innovation, 
legalities, and so forth. 
Second, SOF will be responsive to conditions higher in the system and will be 
impacted not only by environmental and adversarial inputs, but also political and economic 
shifts at the national and strategic level. While businesses also respond to environmental, 
political, and market inputs, they have much more latitude in identifying potential space to 
expand or partner with other organizations. SOF will have to adjust its perceptions of the 
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mutual adjustment is vital for developing synergies with agencies, allies, and partners in a 
multi-domain complex environment with multiple adversaries.92  
Finally, SOF is constrained by the incentive structures and communication 
networks available within the public domain. This includes limitations on hiring, HR 
timelines, salaries and benefits, and geographic locations. While this may seem obvious, it 
has implications for the ability of the SOF to recruit and retain talent in some of the less 
traditionally operational senses. 
Fundamentally, the reality of these constraints is that the trappings of bureaucracy 
cannot be simply stripped away. They must be acknowledged, leveraged, or mitigated 
where possible, and accepted where not. According to James Q. Wilson, “Innovation is not 
inevitably good; there are at least as many bad changes as good. And government agencies 
are especially vulnerable to bad changes because, absent a market that would impose a 
fitness test on any organizational change, a changed public bureaucracy can persist in doing 
the wrong thing for years.”93 Intrapreneurship enables an approach that reduces the 
vulnerability Wilson describes by enabling certain elements of a market fitness test to 
improve responsiveness. Military organizations provide some inherent challenges, but they 
also provide consistent resources, a degree of certainty in structure and function, and the 
administrative support that many entrepreneurial organizations lack. This has the potential 
to establish safe havens for intrapreneurs, people and teams that seek change from within 
the organization. It is important to remember the role of the bureaucracy in the public 
domain which is also to guard against degrading SOF credibility and accountability. 
Through the application of some of the lessons of business, it may be possible to 
establish an environment ripe for intrapreneurial individuals and teams to thrive. As 
Gifford Pinchot suggests, 
Intrapreneurs will make all the difference between your firm’s success and 
failure. The cost of losing entrepreneurial talent is more than just losing a 
skilled technologist or effective marketer. Intrapreneurs are the integrators 
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who combine the talents of both the technologists and the marketers by 
establishing new products, processes, and services. Without them 
innovation remains potential, or moves at the glacial pace of bureaucratic 
processes that no longer suffice in an environment filled with 
entrepreneurial competition.94  
Like bureaucracies, not all SOF are organized, resourced, and developed equally. 
The USSOCOM enterprise, as an example, is larger than some other NATO national armed 
forces. Conversely, many national SOF organizations within NATO member states and 
other connected partnerships are very small and maintain niche capabilities that are 
regionally or uniquely focused. It is simple to look at these leaner organizations as a 
template for intrapreneurship, but the model developed here can be applied equally to small 
and large nation SOF alike. Although there may be resource or policy distinctions between 
SOF, they all tend to have high potential in seeking to change in response to sensing 
environmental or adversarial feedback.  
SOF has predominantly recognized the value of the entrepreneur and this manifests 
through outreach to industry, academia, and the creation of incubators such as SOFWERX 
or Defense Innovation Unit in the U.S. and comparable organizations for other nations.95 
They are fundamentally organized to take ideas or problems within the organization and 
find solutions externally. An approach that deliberately supports identifying problems 
internally through fostering of creativity, the establishment of process and resourcing to 
enable the development of ideas, and integration into practice across SOF will make a 
difference in output. To be clear, this does not need to be a revolutionary change. The 
existing approaches to change and leveraging entrepreneurs outside the organization can 
still provide solutions. Adopting intrapreneurship within the SOF enterprise at any level 
will improve capacity to create and affect change but can be as simple or complex as is 
appropriate for that force. It is the capacity created by combining intrapreneurship and 
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entrepreneurship under bureaucracy that will generate maximum potential. The lessons to 
be explored here are suggestions at best practices for SOF from a headquarters level, down 
to the individual tactical leader seeking options to improve competitive advantage in 
operations.  
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VII. A FRAMEWORK FOR SOF INTRAPRENEURSHIP 
SOF intrapreneurship leverages SOF characteristics to increase innovative 
capacity. SOF intrapreneurship harnesses the benefits from both entrepreneurship and the 
military bureaucracy, while simultaneously seeking to reduce the negatives. While 
entrepreneurship moves SOF towards disorder and agility, military bureaucracy leans 
towards order and stability. Thus, SOF intrapreneurship harvests the best from two worlds 
and, ultimately, increases innovative capacity, the actual potential for development and 
realization of innovation in response to the environment.  
The following three steps of SOF intrapreneurship provide the tools to navigate, 
iterate, and pivot (see Figure 4). The purpose of step 1, navigate, is to put innovation into 
the context of the complex environment and establish organizational framing. Step 2, 
iterate, leverages testing and experimentation to find the “right” innovation and then 
develop it into potential capabilities. Step 3, pivot, is about implementing the innovation 
in accordance with environmental feedback. For illustrative purposes, navigate, iterate, and 
pivot are similar to the varying areas of proficiency that Adamsky identified in his study 
of military innovation within the Soviet Union, The United States, and Israel, respectively. 
The Soviet Union was well versed in a holistic and dialectic approach to navigating the 
complex environment, the United States excelled in iterating innovations, and Israel’s 
pragmatic approach to implementation made them pivot with speed. SOF intrapreneurship 
fuses the advantages of each of these approaches into one.  
The triangle in Figure 4 illustrates an inverted funnel, where outputs are being 
funneled through deliberate practice to create responsive outcomes. Unlike a funnel that 
sees product flow downwards as output by gravity, SOF intrapreneurship requires 
deliberate effort to filter through high volume demands and select outputs for furtherance 
up the framework.  




Figure 4. A framework for SOF intrapreneurship 
Complexity, encompassing the effects of friction, wicked problems, and complex adaptive 
systems on the process, impacts SOF intrapreneurship. Innovations are often solutions to 
wicked problems, emerging within complex adaptive systems, with friction impacting the 
process of innovation development. The framework for SOF intrapreneurship is less linear 
than depicted because the complex environment does not allow for the process to unfold 
linearly. Continuous feedback throughout the process leaves the steps interconnected. For 
instance, informational uncertainties may be revealed at later stages in the process, leaving 
assumptions or developments obsolete or wrong. The framework we use here depends 
therefore on continuous feedback loops that should be considered. Making sense of this 
complexity, nevertheless, is the crucial first step of the framework, to navigate.  
A. NAVIGATE: PUTTING INNOVATIONS INTO CONTEXT 
Navigating is the vital first step of intrapreneurship as it puts all subsequent efforts 
towards innovation into context. This challenges SOF approach as bureaucracy limits 
flexibility and independent assessment while the inherent complexity of the environment 
demands both. Typical strategic assessments within SOF are often done on an infrequent 
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representation of the environment to the organization. This leads to intrapreneurs 
potentially misaligned with organizational goals, lack of capacity to siphon through myriad 
problems and opportunities, and slow pivot speed as it relates to shifting priorities. In order 
to resolve this fundamental issue, SOF intrapreneurship requires an approach to navigation 
consisting of four connected and cyclical elements: interpreting, experimenting, 
effectuating, and networking; see Table 1.  
Table 1. Overview navigate 
Step Element Purpose and Output 
Navigate  1) Interpret 
2) Experiment 
3) Effectuate 
4) Network  
Purpose: Putting innovations into context. 
 
Output: 
- Create mental and formal models 
- Imagine and experiment to improve and develop 
model 
- Prioritize problems, challenges, threats, and 
opportunities 
- Continuously updating understanding/interpretation 
- Communication of mental models, problems, and 
opportunities 
 
The first element to navigating is interpreting the environment, how it will develop, 
and the SOF role in it. The interpretation of the environment, therefore, should honestly 
explore trends, constants, and potential shocks that shape our environment leveraging 
diverse sources. Further, SOF should incorporate parameters established by political and 
strategic levels to appreciate bounds. From a synthesis of these factors, SOF should build 
and develop models for articulation of context for innovation.96 While independent SOF 
assessment may be preferred by the organization, SOF should also be mindful of the 
limitations imposed through rigidity and control of a bureaucracy. Navigating should also 
consider that the actions and preparations taken by SOF may change and manipulate the 
broader environment. As an example, an adversary also navigating may respond pre-
emptively by shifting their own capability mix and fundamentally changing the 
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environment. Understanding feedback loops and accepting emergence are most critical in 
this step is most critical and should be a never-ending endeavor. SOF interpretation of the 
environment results in bounding the problem into discrete and actionable parameters for 
subordinate elements. 
Through realistic analysis of empirically derived data, preferably from several 
sources, SOF can develop an understanding of how the future might unfold.97 Successful 
navigation of complexity has often been due to the creativity and imagination of select 
military professionals, industry leaders, academics, and outliers developing future visions 
of warfare and the environment.98 While such visions will never be perfect, they are, 
nevertheless, an important element of what Adamsky calls a dialectic and holistic approach 
to exploring how the future character of war might unfold.99 Such an approach is curious 
by nature, constantly searching, debating, and exploring the potential of future conflict. It 
requires intellectual and institutional inclination and will usually be imprecise.100 This 
synthesis should be free from both biases and politics, as impossible as that may be. While 
biases often are useful shortcuts to rapid decision-making, they also make humans prone 
to judgment errors.101 
Diversity is critical to enabling accurate depiction of the environment and 
developing effective models for action. Diverse sources are understood as the degree of 
variety in the information sources gathered. Diversity contributes to distinct and creative 
solutions.102 At times, inventing something new is the least favorable approach. Being a 
market follower has inherent advantages in resource and capacity management in some 
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instances. In these cases, simply emulating or imitating innovation can enable SOF to 
prioritize development of in-house innovations for specific requirements where truly 
needed. Competing everywhere has a cost, and selection of competitive terrain is 
important. Leveraging civ-mil relationships and private sector spending along with the 
relationships with other services and allies can deliver efficiencies for SOF. Other activities 
increasing diversity include small unit exchanges with other units (national or foreign), 
engagement with academia (both when in PME and when not), and skunkworks—where a 
diverse team gathers to solve problems without bureaucratic intervention.103 
These initial environmental parameters should be established before a crisis occurs 
in order to be adapted when one arises. Most initial phases of new wars are spent fighting 
with frameworks of old wars overlaid with new technology. Neustadt and May describe 
history as a useful tool but one that must be considered with broader perspective of things 
that have happened while imagining the future by connecting discrete phenomena.104 SOF 
should first and foremost make sense of the environment inclusive of historical 
perspectives and potential emerging trends, constants, and shocks. Drucker points out that 
often, “basic innovations in the military in this century, whether in structure or strategy, 
have followed an ignominious malfunction or crushing defeat.”105 While this perspective 
is not always the case, most innovations have derived from hard lessons that were painfully 
obvious with realistic interpretation of the environment. Most of these environmental 
responses are manifested through the cumbersome development of doctrine in a process 
that flows from delayed analysis and lacks flexibility and feedback for adjustment.106 
Arguably, SOF have been forced to take on some degree of this linear process to mirror 
the requirements of the conventional force and it is vital to pursue more responsive means 
to interpret. 
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SOF should search out lessons from unexpected success and failure and continue 
to consider the most unlikely or surprising options.107 In these, SOF may find 
counterexamples or entirely new approaches that fundamentally change the environment 
in their favor. From this first step, SOF leadership should develop an output consisting of 
an evolving mental model that informs further action and interpretation subordinates in an 
articulated formal model. Sterman describes mental models as useful ways to learn and 
understand complex dynamic systems.108 These mental models are intended to represent 
“our beliefs about the networks of causes and effects that describe how a system operates, 
along with the boundary of the model (which variables are included and which are 
excluded) and the time horizon we consider relevant [for] framing or articulation of a 
problem.”109 This approach will suffice for leadership framing, but more formal 
articulation is required across the organization to align efforts. 
The second element to SOF navigation is experimenting. Sterman would further 
elaborate on this step as a “means to sharpen scientific reasoning skills, improve group 
processes, and overcome defensive outlines for individuals and teams.”110 From the formal 
models articulated to the organization, testing and simulation options should be developed 
to and improve, adjust, or validate prior to constructing approaches and capabilities to deal 
with them.111 While acknowledging there is a degree of uncertainty in the models selected, 
they are intended to simplify and provide options for action. SOF must fundamentally make 
choices in moving forward or find themselves irrelevant. These approaches can be 
managed at any level from SOCOM to detachment and the experimentation to derive best 
advantage should be deliberate. 
Therefore, an organizational bias towards experimentation has proven paramount 
in exploring and refining an understanding of the environment and how it might impact 
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performance. Testing and experimentation are contradictory to the conventional 
bureaucratic and reductionist attempt at analyzing a path to success. Such reductionist 
approaches aim to get it right in one attempt with cumbersome procedural assessments. 
These are often counterproductive, however, as they attempt explaining, analyzing, and 
predicting variables that themselves impossible to grasp. To be clear, this degree of testing 
and experimentation is different from the concept of innovation iteration, to be explored 
later.  
The third element of navigating is effectuation. Models should be continuously 
assessed and updated as conditions change through the practice of effectual reasoning. 
Military leaders are conditioned to use causal rationality as the underlying frame for 
developing plans and operations. This approach involves starting with a goal or vision of 
the end state and assigning means and resources to achieve the optimal alternative to 
achieve that goal.112 As discussed earlier, though, with shifting and changing 
environmental factors and uncertain resources, establishing clear goals and means inhibits 
change. What is needed is a paradigm shift to effectual reasoning. Successful intrapreneurs 
do this well, “they believe in a yet-to-be-made future that can be substantially shaped by 
human action… it is not much use in trying to predict [the future] but better to understand 
and work with people and organizations engaged in the decisions and actions that bring it 
into existence.”113 This suggests a more exploratory approach that involves co-creation: 
understanding the resources and means of multiple agents and combining them in novel 
ways to meet emerging and shifting goals in response to the environment.114  
Effectuation relies much more heavily on human capital of the intrapreneur to use 
personal strengths and resources on hand to develop goals as they emerge—a concept with 
high potential given the selection and mindset inherent in SOF.115 This is a classical 
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reinforcement of the SOF truth that people are more important than hardware. One of the 
most critical aspects of navigation is the notion of sensing or effectuation. The term 
effectuation is derived from effectual reasoning which is a method of reasoning that begins 
with a set of means and emerges over time as new inputs and environmental changes occur. 
It is distinct from causal reasoning which seeks to pursue specific objectives or goals using 
pre-determined resources and approaches.116 Effectuation is like co-creation. It is distinct 
from exploration in that it involves envisioning something not yet in existence.  
Finally, networking ties together all elements of intrapreneurship but is critical to 
navigation. This includes formal networks such as chains of command and control but also 
informal networks such as advocacy and opinion networks. In many cases, informal 
networks bear more weight on innovative capacity than formal hierarchical ones. As Jensen 
describes, “advocacy networks, the pathways along which new ideas circulated through the 
broader defense community, provided the connective tissue. The networks acted as 
contagion vectors, infecting other officers and defense officials with new ideas.”117 Group 
structure, systems, and leader selection will inform the degree and speed of diffusion in 
and between groups bridged in a network and fundamentally drive the capacity to 
communicate and collect information on the environment. Understanding how these 
connections are made and between which individuals and groups are critical for 
understanding the power of networks in enabling navigation and subsequent action. 
Network structure and connections matter and there are numerous laws or approaches to 
confirm that the more nodes connected in a network, the more effective it can be at 
managing complexity. Metcalfe’s Law (named for Robert Metcalfe, the founder of the 
ethernet) for instance, posits that the value or strength “of a network is proportional to the 
square of the” number of connections in the network.118 This suggests that the hierarchical 
nature of military bureaucracy may not be ideal for dealing with complexity in all cases.  
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To summarize, SOF intrapreneurship requires an approach to navigating 
constituting of four elements: interpretation, experimentation, effectuation, and 
networking. Navigation is, importantly, process agnostic because there are numerous 
options and concepts for how to navigate complexity: design thinking, joint operational 
planning, OODA loop, capability-based planning, or simply strategic corporate business 
planning methods. Each approach will have advantages and disadvantages depending on 
the organization, leadership, environment, and bureaucratic demands. Regardless, the 
process chosen should develop interpretation of the environment and enable decision 
making regarding potential actions therein. Fundamentally, the navigational approach 
should be considered as what we have termed “environment-based planning.” Developing 
and iterating the innovations that arise as a result of navigation are the next steps in 
intrapreneurship. By continuously refining and updating our understanding of the complex 
environment based on feedback loops, SOF will be better prepared to act within it through 
iteration. 
B. ITERATE: IDENTIFYING AND DEVELOPING INNOVATIONS 
Iterating involves the deliberate adjustment of innovations and processes over time 
in response to environmental feedback. It will enable SOF to filter through the volume of 
inventions and ideas developed by intrapreneurs and the bureaucratic process in order to 
prioritize the most impactful for improving competitive advantage. Current intrapreneurs 
are not deliberately identified nor supported and thus many innovations lack capacity to 
iterate within the system forcing them to either wither, delay, or leave the organization. 
Further, those that make the cut for prioritization for resources and support often lack 
capacity for experimentation and adjustment over time. This leads to innovation that are 
inappropriate or irrelevant by the time they are diffused through the force. Organizations 
can develop minimum viable product required to initially demonstrate and prove concepts 
that are hypothesized to be valuable. This exploration of iteration will describe three 
elements: sourcing and selecting opportunities, organizing teams, and conducting rapid 
prototyping; see Table 2. 
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Table 2. Overview iterate 
Step Element Purpose /output 






Purpose: Identifying and developing innovations 
 
Output: 
- Problems and opportunities prioritized and 
resourced 
- Organize (and re-organize) for innovative capacity 
- Fail quickly for minimal resources to identify and 
develop innovations 
 
First, SOF should conduct a deliberate search for opportunities and prioritize their 
development, resourcing, implementation, and adjustment based on the context established 
during navigation. These opportunities exist all around and within the organization but 
many of them are missed or fail to develop either due to bureaucratic process, lack of 
leadership investment, or poor timing. Creating an opportunity-focused organization can 
enable the iteration of meaningful innovations by enabling the best opportunities to gain 
resourcing and support. McGrath and MacMillan describe the importance of sourcing and 
registering opportunities into a meaningful, shareable, and traceable library. As 
intrapreneurial ideas are generated within the organization, it is critical to ensure they are 
noted and saved as many are often not relevant at the time but become so as the 
environment changes. What is needed is the combination of experience and opportunity 
and the gradual shaping of those opportunities by intrapreneurs understanding the resources 
and limitations around them. There is a fine line between an idea and an opportunity and 
the delineation amounts to research, testing, resourcing, potential practical applicability, 
and relevance to organizational tasks.119 The source of these opportunities is less important 
than the organizational management of them. 
As opportunities are nurtured from problems into ideas and potential options, SOF 
should have a mechanism to collect and track them, assess against resourcing criteria, and 
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winnow down to those high-potential opportunities that could be implemented.120 Many 
of these opportunities will be time sensitive as competitors or environmental conditions 
adapt and potentially overtake relevance or shift requirements. These opportunities could 
be as complicated as investments in technology, partnering with industry or academia for 
specific initiatives, or testing tactics through exercises and deployments. They could also 
be as simple as a new process for administration in a unit, recruitment messaging for a 
target audience, or revised authorities for training at the troop level. Managing 
opportunities is conducted much in the way that investors look at real options reasoning.121 
Leadership should assess the likelihood of investment in an opportunity paying off in the 
environment by also understanding the degrees of uncertainty impacting those investments 
and be prepared for alternative possibilities. If SOF can sense and respond to environmental 
changes by selecting and developing the right opportunities, it will flourish. If not, SOF 
will see decline.122 Opportunities in SOF intrapreneurship only exist if they are identified, 
developed, and captured.123 This will be developed further through portfolio management 
in the third element of SOF intrapreneurship. 
Second, increasing innovative capacity requires creating the organization with the 
intrapreneurial characteristics and mindset required to support both individuals and teams 
in developing these opportunities. This involves shifting resources, people, and networks 
from those organizational elements that do not meet criteria for continuously adding value 
to those that are higher value-added in practice or potential.124 In bureaucracies, the 
internal processes are entrenched and, in some cases, become barriers to reconfiguration. 
One solution is the creation and empowerment of small and autonomous teams to develop 
diverse, holistic solutions. Small teams are understood as a dedicated number of individuals 
tasked with solving specific problems, often on an ad-hoc basis and often with diverse or 
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multi-disciplinary composition. While a diverse pool of personnel, with varying 
backgrounds, experiences, education, training, and cultures, is fundamental to internal 
diversity, one can make up for lack of diversity internally with external sources. It could 
be civilian sources, sources from allies and partners, or even sources from the adversary.125 
This approach enables focused effort on specific issues that individuals or groups have a 
personal investment in. These teams are designed to develop the opportunities identified 
during the navigation stage while also sensing potential breakout options for further. 
Autonomous teams are diverse in composition, structure, and formality. They 
should be established with sufficient leadership support or patronage and freedom to 
develop solutions. Indeed, the team should have the support to challenge the status quo, if 
necessary. They should be empowered to share, exchange and gather information internally 
and externally with the necessary authority to plan and act. These teams can be assigned 
formal responsibilities for specific opportunities or can exist within their existing task 
environment and given slack. The concept of slack has emerged in business literature as 
“potentially utilizable resources that can be diverted or redeployed for the achievement of 
organizational goals.”126 In simple terms, slack refers to the freedom of the intrapreneur 
to manage a degree of human, material, and temporal resources to pursue innovation. Slack 
is a prerequisite for SOF intrapreneurs, as it provides space in which creativity can grow 
and opportunities can be exploited.127 One of the challenges for such teams in a 
bureaucracy is policy, focus and capacity given the competing requirements of sustaining 
the organization. The solution to the problem is one of focus—the ambidextrous 
organization. 
Weaving autonomous teams into an ambidextrous organizational construct enables 
SOF to serve more than one distinct functional capacity such as bureaucratic institutional 
business with mandated processes and existing tasks, while also looking forward to ground-
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breaking change supported by intrapreneurship.128 As an example, such an organization 
relates to the concept to the Roman god Janus, known for having two sets of eyes, one 
looking backward and another looking forward.129 Conscious separation of the exploratory 
(forward-leaning) segments of the enterprise from exploitative (rearward-leaning) ones 
with allowances for distinct culture, rules, structure, and processes may allow for better 
potential for success.130 To ensure strategic direction and alignment though, these distinct 
elements should be harmonized through leadership, vision, and central purpose. Such 
decisions are not always simple or popular as they establish unique environments for 
elements of the same organization and can challenge leaders in their commitment and 
incentives. Success requires a network strategy that is founded on leaders with united and 
consistent messaging supportive of the same overall purpose, but with a degree of latitude 
to plan, manage and execute in their unique functional area.131 
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Figure 5. Organizational design options.132 
SOF consist of different sub-organizations with different mission statements and 
structures but it is important to consider their relative intrapreneurial requirements 
uniquely. The ambidextrous organization concept allows practitioners to carefully consider 
their sub-organizations and align them accordingly. This could result in a SOCOM-like 
headquarters specifically organized and aligned with interface in the broader conventional 
force while maintaining the forward-looking capability to enable sub-organizations. It 
could also be managed within the sub-organizations or units themselves. At the unit level, 
this could entail sub-units or teams with unique structure and purpose as part of a transient 
design effort to ensure the right organizations are enabled to maximum effect depending 
on task and environment. Finally, these teams should be structured and designed with 
capacity to restructure. Just like the ability to reconfigure physical resources to support 
innovation, SOF should be willing and able to reconfigure teams to that end. 
Responding to changing environmental conditions and emerging situations requires 
an organizational formation that is responsive to change without excessive resistance, 
evolving and shifting in and out of focus as feedback demands.133 It requires a willingness 
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to change, the ability to reconceptualize risk and costs, flexibility, and a willingness to 
divest capabilities and concepts that no longer contribute to meaningful outputs. It requires 
an acceptance that there are no solutions in the sense of objective or definitive outcomes. 
The issue is fundamentally organizational vice environmental as “the stagnation of 
innovation in large organizations is the almost inevitable result of the currently fashionable 
systems of analysis and control.”134 There is great resistance to changing core tasks or 
imposing new ones that are inconsistent with historic values or process regardless of the 
environmental or market inputs.135 Organizations that tend towards structures or tasks will 
inevitably choose environments or problems to suit them. This is unforgivable in the realm 
of emerging private industry startups that have no choice but to adapt or die yet SOF seem 
to accept this condition. Thus, SOF organizational design is vital to the successful conduct 
of intrapreneurship. 
Third, the teams should conduct rapid prototyping to solve problems because 
simply, trial and error lead to identifying failure early.136 For the purposes of this element, 
our definition of “rapid prototyping” will include both pretotyping and prototyping as 
distinct yet linked concepts. Pretotyping and prototyping are two critical avenues for 
iteration. Pretotyping is defined by Savoia as “testing the initial appeal and actual usage of 
a potential new product or service by simulating its core experience with the smallest 
possible investment of time and money.”137 It is distinct from prototyping in that it can 
use a bare-minimum surrogate or mock-up to test and validate concepts well before actual 
prototypes are required. The best tests fail early, avoiding spending time, energy, and 
resources on the wrong things poorly. This requires revised appreciation of risk in 
development but also in fielding.  
For prototyping to become a relevant component of military doctrine, 
promising weapon systems will need to be delivered quickly to the 
operational forces in limited quantities, with the option of building or 
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modifying the base design for future use. These prototypes may be produced 
at a lower cost and may only need to be operational for a short time 
period.138 
In the military, bureaucratic tendencies typical of large governmental 
organizations, tend to create incentive structures that seldom favor uncertainty and risk.139 
In fact, failure is often counterfactual to military culture. Yet, iterative approaches are 
designed to fail early in order to evolve and succeed quickly and “using special operations 
forces as the laboratory could leverage the military community most comfortable with the 
rapidity, cognitive flexibility, and risk tolerance necessary for prototyping.”140  
Testing, trial, and experimentation are vital to iteration. Murray and Millett state 
that innovation demands “that military organizations judge the potential and possibilities 
of future war in a realistic fashion. Here the...business of exercises and realistic war games 
lay at the heart of effective innovation.”141 There is an important distinction to be made 
between lessons identified and lessons learned. How SOF conducts its testing, trial, and 
experimentation is less important than its ability to draw and learn from lessons identified. 
Rapid prototyping allows intrapreneurs to utilize progressive testing to determine if an 
approach or concept is even the right one before investing resources and capacity to 
develop further or gain inertia in bureaucratic processes. Fundamentally, these efforts will 
seek to determine if it is the right thing to build then also build it the right way. Both are 
essential processes to ensure that innovations are suitable and appropriate for solving the 
problems or opportunities identified through navigation.  
Beyond building, experimenting, and testing, failing is of vital importance. 
Through failure, hard organizational lessons are observed and should be learned from. 
Savoia describes “the Law of Failure” as the notion that most “new its” will fail—even if 
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they are flawlessly executed.”142 This becomes increasingly problematic for high-
reliability organizations that are acculturated to success and assign negative value 
connotations to failure. In most militaries, the individual and organizational reward system 
are structured to support success and punish failure. This is at odds with the requirements 
for intrapreneurship. SOF should reconsider incentives and allowances for failure and 
encourage it early in iteration. 
To summarize, iteration enables SOF to identify and develop innovations to 
environmental problems, and shift resources quickly. Current practices often tie resources 
and organizational commitment to outcomes that may not be appropriate in conditions of 
change or uncertainty. In order to successfully convert navigation into outcomes, SOF 
should deliberately source opportunity, establish focused autonomous teams through 
organizational design, and emphasize rapid prototyping to develop minimum viable 
product as part of gradual experimentation. Maintaining these practices will enable SOF to 
pivot when required. 
C. PIVOT: IMPLEMENTING INNOVATIONS 
Pivoting is concerned with implementing the good innovations. Since all 
innovations involve change, yet all innovations are not good, pivoting is focused on 
choosing what innovations to implement and changing the organization. The challenge, 
however, is that complexity makes measuring the effectiveness of innovations difficult. 
When a decision is made, moreover, militaries are ill-suited to change; bureaucracies are 
to a certain degree built not to change. Even SOF are prone to many of the same challenges 
as the conventional part of the military. To succeed in pivoting, SOF require a decision and 
the necessary financial and organizational capacity to change. To be sure, when the scope 
of change of an innovation increases, the decision often proves harder to make and the 
required financial and/or organizational capacity to pivot increases as well.143  
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Table 3. Overview pivot 
Step Element Purpose /output 
Pivot  1) Decide 
2) Change 
 
Purpose: Implementing innovations 
 
Output: 
- Decision to implement innovation 
- Innovation implemented 
 
The first element of pivoting is deciding to do so. The decision to pivot is often 
clouded with uncertainty, risk, and opportunity costs. Opportunity costs for instance—what 
is lost by pursuing a specific innovation—may present difficulties for decision-makers, 
especially under resource constraints. Opportunity costs are further exacerbated by the fact 
that there might be uncertainty related to whether or not the innovation will prove effective; 
after all, there are as many bad changes as good and bureaucracies are especially 
vulnerable.144 And where there is uncertainty, there is usually also risk. In a risk-averse 
organization, such as the military, this proposes a challenge for decision-makers. Not only 
are uncertainty and risk associated with the actual decision from an organizational 
perspective, but also a cultural and individual risk to the individual making the decision. 
These challenges to the decision of pivoting are real. They require individuals and 
organizations to be able to cope with uncertainty and risk. However, those that successfully 
navigate and iterate, will already have deliberately developed an innovation for a specific 
context and be better positioned to decide.  
Managing a portfolio of emerging opportunities balanced with core business can 
enable decision-making.145 Like a venture capital firm, SOF should constantly assess their 
investments to ensure they continue to deliver value or potential value in a changing 
marketplace. Given an organizational context bounded by policy and resource capacity 
limitations, it is critical to ensure that investment in both financial and human capital is 
delivered to the right opportunities. Portfolio management refers to gaining “an 
understanding of which business opportunities would make the most substantial 
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contribution to the future for your organization. The next challenge is to figure out how 
you are going to allocate resources to those opportunities you elect to pursue.”146 The key 
element here is understanding that the opportunities may be almost endless but that SOF 
must make choices in pursuit of advantage lest they get overwhelmed in the noise or 
degrade resources impacting core operations. 
It is important to understand that there is an underlying carrying capacity within 
each SOF system and within the broader bureaucracy that supports it. Like an ecosystem, 
the cost for each constituent opportunity or capability will impact the carrying capacity of 
the system and it may be forced to self-regulate if exceeded. Without prioritization or 
increased resourcing, this regulation will lead to either broad degradation, specific failure 
or omission, or success at the expense of another opportunity. Once assessed, the carrying 
capacity becomes one of the foundational elements of the process of portfolio management. 
Thorough systems analysis should be conducted to understand this capacity in more than 
just resource terms. Networks, communication, authorities, funding, training time and 
access, and strategy are simple examples of factors affecting this capacity and should be 
managed deliberately to ensure that the right opportunities are receiving focus while those 
less significant are either divested or diminished.147 
Portfolio management requires thresholds for performance, timelines, metrics for 
adjustment, and feedback loops to decision-makers. First and foremost, however, SOF 
should select which opportunities to pursue, to what extent, and at what time. The process 
of portfolio management requires disciplined focus resulting in hard choices. At times, 
these choices require balancing existing and emerging activities and at times, abandoning 
ongoing efforts in favor of higher payoff opportunities.148 In a SOF context, this means 
that training activities and affiliations, equipment procurements, recruiting focus, 
operational targets and tasks, and force development should all be rooted in the objective 
mapping of opportunities over capabilities. Portfolio management is a concept that is not 
 
146 McGrath and MacMillan, The Entrepreneurial Mindset, 2000, 163. 
147 McGrath and MacMillan, The Entrepreneurial Mindset, 2000, 180–84. 
148 McGrath and MacMillan, 131–33. 
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well understood in military domains as the resourcing and investment into products and 
activities is rarely shifted or terminated prematurely based on emerging conditions on short 
time horizons as the modern operating environment now demands. 
Some operational mandates will inevitably be a resource sink but must be 
conducted due to strategic importance or specific direction. When looking at current 
practices and future opportunities, it is important to assess their potential as winners or 
losers in the context of improving potential competitive advantage in the environment. To 
make room for new opportunities and capabilities in the portfolio, disengagement should 
be continuous and deliberate. According to McGrath, “disengagement—the process of 
moving out of an exhausted opportunity—is as core to the business as innovation, growth, 
and exploitation are.”149 Managing a portfolio of capabilities involves more than simply 
identifying them and assigning tangible resources. Rather, it is a deliberate assessment of 
capacity followed by intentional management of resources and attention over time. This 
should be done continuously with realistic decisions determining when to invest more and 
when to cut losses. 
Understanding the limitations of time and resources inherent in all SOF 
organizations, prioritizing investment in opportunities to develop capabilities and outputs 
is key. This is done through iteration and enables SOF to ebb and flow with the shifting 
environmental assessment conducted while navigating. Testing and trialing all manner of 
innovations at the lowest possible cost through rapid prototyping preserve capacity for 
operational outputs and other innovations critical to the enterprise. Finally, managing 
capabilities and innovations in a deliberate portfolio approach enables decision making that 
supports implementation of change. 
The second element to pivoting is the capacity to change. SOF require the financial 
and organizational capacity to change once a decision is made (see Figure 6). On the one 
hand, financial capacity refers to the total financial resources required for the successful 
 
149 McGrath, The End of Competitive Advantage, 21.  
   
 
53 
implementation of an innovation.150 The higher the cost, the lower the probability of 
implementation.  
 
Figure 6. Capacity to change depends on financial and organizational 
capacity.151  
Organizational capacity, on the other hand, is understood as the organizational 
ability to implement an innovation.152 We will explore four indicators of organizational 
capacity to change: organizational age, formulation of tasks, amount of experimentation, 
and leadership support. First, since increasing organizational age slows the rate of change 
due to increasing bureaucratization and rigidity, organizations with high capacity to 
change, work around bureaucratization to maintain agility.153 An illustration of such 
bureaucratization is the creation of hierarchical “gatekeepers”—key individuals within the 
organization—with the power to inhibit implementation “by filtering, sidelining, and 
 
150 Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power, 30–32.  
151 Adapted from Horowitz, 49.  
152 Horowitz, 39.  
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ignoring competing sources of advice and information.”154 These gatekeepers can impose 
large amounts of bureaucratic power resisting change, simply because more veto points 
slow decision making and decrease the likelihood of change.155 The creation of small, 
autonomous, and protected teams described in step 2, iterate, is one example to work 
around organizational age. Second, the broader the organization’s formulation of tasks, the 
higher the capacity to change because changes in accordance with the existing perception 
of tasks meet less resistance when implemented.156 The formulation of tasks shapes the 
internal processes and methods of organizations.157 As such, when change is in accordance 
with these processes and methods, the bureaucratic resistance is reduced because disrupting 
innovations often meet more resistance; as they often change tasks or processes, instead of 
just improving the current way of doing business.158 Some have even argued for disguising 
disruptive innovations as sustaining innovations, so that bureaucratic resistance does not 
hamper implementation.159 The broader an organization’s formulation of tasks, the higher 
the capacity to change. Third, an organizational praxis of experimentation increases the 
capacity to pivot, because it increases organizational willingness to change.160 
Organizations spending resources on experimentation, such as experimentation in step 1 
and rapid prototyping in step 2, are more likely to obtain feedback from the environment 
and the organizational willingness to change are likely to increase.161 Fourth, leadership 
support is critical, because leadership has an important role in protecting, diffusing, and 
 
154 Adam M. Jungdahl and Julia M. Macdonald, “Innovation Inhibitors in War: Overcoming 
Obstacles in the Pursuit of Military Effectiveness,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 4 (June 7, 2015): 
467. 
155 Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power, 38.  
156 Wilson, Bureaucracy, 222.  
157 Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power, 36.  
158 Terry Pierce, Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies, 20–21. 
159 Terry Pierce, 32. 
160 Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power, 37.  
161 Horowitz, 37.  
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legitimizing change.162 In some cases, both senior civilian and military leadership 
intervention is required for successful implementation.163 In shorter-term implementation 
processes, leadership’s role is important for protecting and legitimizing ideas and 
individuals.164 In longer-term implementation processes, career paths for individuals and 
personnel management become more important, since politics matter in organizations.165  
To summarize, as the scale of the innovation increases, the probability of successful 
implementation decreases. Decisions to implement innovations are likely to entail a degree 
of uncertainty and risk. The capacity to change once a decision is made, on the other hand, 
involves both financial and organizational capacity. At this stage, an innovation will either 
be successfully implemented or not. SOF Intrapreneurs will then return to step 1 to navigate 
and assess the effectiveness of the innovation in the complex environment.  
 
162 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the 
World Wars (New York: Cornell University Press, 1984), 225; Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 19–21, 252; Murray, “Innovation: Past and Future,” 325–28; 
Jensen, Forging the Sword, 23, 145.  
163 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 225; Rosen, Winning the Next War, 21.  
164 Jensen, Forging the Sword, 23, 145. 
165 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 19–20, 252.  
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Throughout the process of developing the framework for SOF intrapreneurship, we 
have identified and resolved a number of challenges. While these challenges have been of 
the utmost value for reflection and improvement, some could prove useful for others and 
will be addressed here.  
First, some would argue that SOF are already doing all of this.166 While SOF are 
certainly better poised than conventional forces to adopt SOF intrapreneurship, we hold 
that there is still a lot of potential for SOF to become more innovative. There are also 
differences between various SOF and some are certainly more advanced in SOF 
intrapreneurship than others. For instance, education is paramount to creating an 
intrapreneurial organization.167 Yet, in our experience, professional military education is 
still disproportionally focused on producing orderly officers through institutionalization, 
instead of responsive and change-prone leaders through innovation. While elements of the 
institutionalization disappear through selection processes to SOF and cultural differences 
in SOF , true adoption of a concept like, or similar to, SOF intrapreneurship requires 
specific education of personnel of all categories in the organization. At present, such 
education is lacking, both for conventional forces and SOF. While SOF, therefore, to 
varying degrees have adopted elements of SOF intrapreneurship, this is more due to 
experience and lucky coincidence, than due to a coherent and academically attributed 
approach.  
Second, some would argue that SOF intrapreneurship is not SOF-specific and could 
be adopted by conventional military organizations alike. To a certain degree, we agree. 
There is no one thing that conventional military organizations could not do in the 
 
166 See for instance the works of Spulak, Schultz, and Blanken et al.:Robert G. Spulak, Jr, “Innovate 
or Die: Innovation and Technology for Special Operations,” JSOU Report (MacDill Air Force Base, 
Florida: Joint Special Operations University, December 2010), https://www.socom.mil/JSOU/
JSOUPublications/JSOU10-7spulakInnovate_final.pdf; Richard Schultz, “Military Innovation in War: It 
Takes a Learning Organization,” JSOU Report (MacDill Air Force Base, Florida: Joint Special Operations 
University, 2016); Blanken, Swintek, and Davis, “Special Operations as an Innovation Laboratory.” 
167 Murray, “Innovation: Past and Future,” 325–28. 
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framework presented. However, as explored in THE MILITARY BUREAUCRACY AND 
SOF, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SOF, and A BETTER PATHWAY: 
INTRAPRENEURSHIP, there are differences between SOF and conventional forces 
making the framework of SOF intrapreneurship easier and more likely to be adopted and 
implemented by SOF. Moreover, if larger-sized conventional units were to adopt SOF 
intrapreneurship, it would move the organization towards disorder and remove some of the 
stability and rigidity that military organizations impose to reduce the impact of friction. 
Depending on the specific military organization, of course, such a move could increase 
organizational complexity and move the organization towards a better balance between 
order and disorder, yet it would never achieve the same level of organizational complexity 
that a relatively smaller SOF element could achieve.  
Third, detailed attempts at producing standard operating procedures for innovation 
may very well end up suffocating it (often due to an ill-placed tension towards order—
rigidity, procedures, and bureaucracy).168 Since we are aware of this fact, the framework 
is purposefully generalized. We have taken care to give users of the framework room to 
interpret and employ it in the most fitting way to their distinct organization and 
environment.  
Fourth, it might be asked if the framework generally explains successful innovation. 
We believe that adopting a framework of SOF intrapreneurship increases the likelihood of 
successful innovation. However, to paraphrase a famous saying, while the framework of 
SOF intrapreneurship is certainly wrong, it might still be useful.169 SOF intrapreneurship, 
moreover, is only one way of describing the process of innovation. And while both of us 
have spent close to two years studying the phenomena, we certainly do not believe this is 
the last word; the framework could certainly be developed further through additional 
research. 
 
168 Murray, 320. 
169 The quote “all models are wrong, but some are useful” is often attributed to statistician Box in this 
article: George E. P. Box, “Science and Statistics,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 71, no. 
356 (1976): 791–99, https://doi.org/10.2307/2286841. 
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Last, does literature from the business world really lend itself to military 
organizations? If we have not convinced the reader at this point, then this paragraph will 
likely not change someone’s mind. We do, of course, acknowledge that there are 
fundamental distinctions between SOF and business endeavors, the most obvious being 
that risk of failure presents very different consequences—financial loss versus the loss of 
life, or, going bankrupt versus losing the war. Despite the differences, there are many 
similarities between the demands for innovation in complex environments. We believe it 
would be ignorant, arrogant, and foolish to dismiss the hard-earned experiences made in 
the fields of business if there is the slightest chance that they might reduce loss of life, or 
even make the marginal difference to avoid losing the next war.  
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As Eric Schmidt stated in his address to the Armed Services Committee, “success 
no longer goes to the country that creates a tech-first, but to the country, that better 
integrates and adapts its way of fighting.”170 We have seen through our development of 
SOF intrapreneurship that invention is not enough—innovation is the what and 
intrapreneurship is the how. Deliberately creating an ecosystem that balances the freedom 
of entrepreneurship with the rigidity of bureaucracy is vital to both creative destruction and 
preservation of institutional capacity. Ultimately, strategy drives where the SOF fits on that 
spectrum and thus define the character of intrapreneurship best suited to compete in the 
environment. Navigating establishes fundamental parameters for the organization, iteration 
ensures smart investment and capacity to refine with changing demands and pivoting 
ensures SOF can apply the highest degree of advantage at a time of its choosing.  
It is clear that SOF already possess many of the underlying characteristics of 
intrapreneurship, having been built or evolved into distinct entities from the conventional 
force over a period of time. While these features of SOF have not arisen from a deliberate 
attempt to learn and apply the lessons described herein, they are strikingly suitable to adopt 
SOF intrapreneurship. In studying the literature on innovation and entrepreneurship, we 
have suggested that SOF intrapreneurship provides a meaningful mechanism for aligning 
efforts of an organization over time to improve innovative capacity. As Western senior 
military and civilian leadership emphasize emerging challenges of Great Power 
Competition, SOF can continue to remain “special” and be the intrapreneur of the military 
domain of national power. 
 
170 Schmidt, “Statement to House Armed Services Committee.” 
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APPENDIX A:  LITERATURE USED IN THE FRAMEWORK 
Table 4. Literature used in the framework for SOF intrapreneurship 
 
Literature Navigate Iterate Pivot 
Adamsky (2010) X   
Adamsky & Bjerga (2012) X   
Blanken et al. (2020)  X  
Buchanan (2001) X   
Drucker (1993) X   
George (2005)  X  
Hasselbladh & Yden (2019)  X  
Horowitz (2010)   X 
Jensen (2016) X  X 
Jungdahl & Macdonald 
(2015) 
  X 
Kozloski (2017)  X  
Luecke (1994)  X  
McGrath (2013)  X X 
McGrath and MacMillian 
(2000) 
 X X 
Millett & Murray (1996) X X  
Mintzberg et. al. (1988)  X X  
Murray (1996) X   
Murray & Watts (1996) X   
Neustadt and May (1988) X   
O’Reilly III and Tushman 
(2004) 
 X  
Pierce (2004)  X X 
Posen (1984)   X 
Rogers (2003) X   
Rosen (1991)   X 
Savoia (2011)  X  
Sarasvathy (2008) X   
Spencer (2018) X   
Sterman (2000) X   
Thornberry (2006)  X  
Wilson (2000)  X X 
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APPENDIX B:  OVERVIEW OF SOF INTRAPRENEURSHIP   
Table 5. Overview of SOF intrapreneurship 
Step Element Purpose /output 
Navigate  1) Interpret 
2) Experiment 
3) Effectuate 
4) Network  
Purpose: Putting innovations into context. 
 
Output: 
- Create mental and formal models 
- Imagine and experiment to improve and develop 
model 
- Prioritize problems, challenges, threats, and 
opportunities 
- Continuously updating understanding/interpretation 
- Communication of mental models, problems, and 
opportunities 






Purpose: Identifying and developing innovations 
 
Output: 
- Problems and opportunities prioritized and 
resourced 
- Organize (and re-organize) for innovative capacity 
- Fail quickly for minimal resources to identify and 
develop innovations 
Pivot  1) Decide 
2) Change 
 
Purpose: Implementing innovations 
 
Output: 
- Decision to implement innovation 
- Innovation implemented 
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APPENDIX C:  DEFINITIONS 
Complexity: Understood as the effects of friction, wicked problems, and complex 
adaptive systems on the process. 
Entrepreneurship: The practice of systemic innovation.171  
Entrepreneur: Any individual or organization that constantly searches for change 
in uncertainty, responds to it, and exploits it as an opportunity.172 
Innovation: “The successful exploitation of new ideas.”173 
Innovative capacity: Actual potential for development and realization of innovation 
in response to the environment. 
Intrapreneurship: Enabling freedom of experimentation and co-creation within a 
bureaucracy. 
Iterate: Step 2 of SOF intrapreneurship, identifies and develops innovations. 
Military Bureaucracy: Designed to “exercise large-scale violence as the ultimate 
tool of sovereign nation-states,” leaving military organizations distinct from other 
bureaucracies, yet still portraying traditional bureaucratic characteristics such as 
formalization, hierarchy, and institutionalization.174  
Navigate: Step 1 of SOF intrapreneurship, puts innovations into context. 
Pivot: Step 3 of SOF intrapreneurship, implements innovations. 
 
171 Peter F. Drucker, “The Discipline of Innovation,” Harvard Business Review, no. Best of HBR 
(August 2002): 10. 
172 Drucker, Innovation and Entrepreneurship, 28. 
173 Baregheh, Rowley, and Sambrook, “Towards a Multidisciplinary Definition of Innovation.” 
174 Hasselbladh and Ydén, “Why Military Organizations Are Cautious About Learning?,” 5. 
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Special Operations Forces (SOF): “Small, specially organized units manned by 
carefully selected people using modified equipment and trained in unconventional 
applications of tactics.”175 




175 Spulak, Jr, “A Theory of Special Operations,” 1. 
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